RCS: What Is the Problem?
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NEWS
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Rich Communication Services (RCS) messaging has been brought under fire by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), with the lack of end-to-end encryption (a result of a failure between manufacturers such as Google and Apple to work together in implementing interoperable security), leading to consumers being urged to adopt alternatives such as WhatsApp and Telegram. RCS, which is the basis for proprietary messaging such as Apple’s iMessage, is a more fully-featured approach to messaging, but is built into handsets just like Short Message Service (SMS), without the need to download additional messaging apps. However, there is a disconnect between the built-in solutions across manufacturers, limiting security and leaving messages open to exploitation from hackers such as the Chinese-backed Salt Typhoon threat actor.
Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) have good cause for celebration here, as RCS poses challenges compared to traditional SMS. While the additional features might be argued to keep end users closer to the core ecosystem and away from third-party applications, RCS presents a security problem to operators that have extremely limited visibility of this type of traffic. Spam through this channel is, therefore, difficult to control, with MNOs having no visibility of the internals of the data packets and, therefore, limited ability to identify and block malicious traffic.
The FBI poses this as yet another antitrust issue, highlighting a failure of the manufacturers to work together and urging consumers to look elsewhere for their messaging needs for their own security. While the GSMA has stated intent to ensure end-to-end encryption across platforms, and software updates such as iOS 18 are improving inter-Operating System (OS) RCS support, this remains nascent, and the stark warning issued by the FBI directly to consumers highlights that manufacturers have dragged their feet too long.
Move Now or Lose Ground
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RECOMMENDATIONS
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For manufacturers, the message is clear—full interoperability is increasingly non-optional, and monopolizing tactics will not be tolerated. Amid a range of other similarly antitrust-focused decisions, particularly in the European Union (EU), Apple, in particular, will be forced in the coming years to learn to play well with others in the ecosystem, and transition from its walled garden approach. All manufacturers will need to start tackling interoperability early in the design process, treating competitors as partners in certain development avenues if they want to avoid embarrassing rebukes such as this one happening again.
For MNOs, this poses an opportunity to be part of the discussion, with an open dialogue on interoperability providing the opportunity to make improvements on the RCS “black box,” which is compromising the security of their networks.
For secure messaging app developers, this is clearly an incredible advert. If RCS goes the same way as SMS—that is, heavily focused on automated business to consumer messages—the majority of human-to-human conversations will be happening through encrypted channels owned by app providers. While both Telegram and Signal remain founder-owned, WhatsApp is now owned by Facebook after a staggering US$16 billion acquisition in 2016. Should manufacturers fail to address problems with RCS, or fail to provide secure competition to these apps, the usage and valuations will continue to grow while manufacturers lose their grip on the handset experience.
For all, this presents an opportunity to shift market shares and change the consumer relationship with messaging. If messaging mirrors the opening of the Secure Element (SE)—another Apple-focused antitrust decision—consumers could have even more opportunity to change their default behaviors and shop around. For operators concerned about a loss of visibility in the customer journey in an Embedded Secure Identity Module (eSIM)-enabled cellular landscape, there are opportunities to differentiate by guiding this decision and being a part of the new landscape.